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THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN. By Francis Fukuyama. 
New York: The Free Press. 1992. Pp. xxiii, 418. $24.95. 
CIVIL SOCIETY AND PoLmCAL THEORY. By Jean L. Cohen and An-
drew Arato. Cambridge: MIT Press. 1992. Pp. xxi, 771. $45. 
l. THE CURTAIN PARTS 
Forty years a firmament dividing East and West, Left and Right, 
State and Market, the iron curtain one day crumbled like so much 
meringue. With it crumbled many realities and realisms that once 
seemed hard as gunmetal: the determination of international relations 
by the interests and relative strength of military elites, the total control 
of totalitarian states over their societies, the pseudosophisticated view 
that, in Francis Fukuyama's phrase, "nation-states [are] like billiard 
balls, whose internal contents, hidden by opaque shells, are irrelevant 
in predicting their behavior" (p. 248). The shells cracked, the curtain 
parted, and the intractable reality that force rules politics was, at least 
for the moment, exposed as mere appearance. 
In a chapter of his Phenomenology entitled "Force and Under-
standing: Appearance and the Supersensible World,"1 Hegel evokes 
the vertigo we experience at such moments, when the forces that rule 
our world are revealed to be contingent interpretive constructs. We 
need simplifying generalizations to order our world, and living in an 
ordered world means treating its regularities as real, its particularity as 
ephemeral, even illusory. But when regularity itself proves ephemeral, 
we are reminded that our world was always capable of infinitely varied 
interpretation. At such moments theories abound, interpretive con-
structs sell for a quarter on every corner, while contingency and 
change seem like the only constants. Our world inverts and the rain-
bow seems realer than the laws of optics.2 
The experience of this inversion, in which the world suddenly 
seems much realer than our ideas of it, paradoxically propels us to-
ward idealism. At the moment when the proud mind - its expecta-
tions dramatically defeated - might be expected to yield in humility 
• Professor of Law, SUNY, Buffalo. A.B. 1977, Princeton; J.D. 1980, Yale. - Ed. 
1. G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHENOMENOLOG)' OF MIND 179·213 (J.B. Baillie trans., rev. 2d ed., 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1949) (1807). 
2. See id. at 197-210. 
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to events, it is distracted by its own reflection. "How wrong I was," it 
marvels, "but how powerful. For the past forty years, it is I who have 
ruled the world - not national interest, not nuclear balance, not mili-
tary force, not totalitarian bureaucracy - but I who imagined each of 
these forces." 
Just when events clamor for our attention, we become most con-
scious of the operation of our minds in structuring and interpreting 
the world of events. The really momentous changes, the real disconti-
nuities, it then seems, are in the realm of thought rather than events. 
And so our gaze focuses through events, at ourselves. 3 
Th[e] curtain ... hanging before the inner world is withdrawn, and we 
have here the inner being gazing into the inner realm . . . . [W]hat we 
have here is Self-consciousness. It is manifest that behind the so-called 
curtain, which is to hide the inner world, there is nothing to be seen 
unless we ourselves go behind there, as much in order that we may 
thereby see, as that there may be something behind there which can be 
seen.4 
So today as we gaze in wonder, eastward or westward as geogra-
phy dictates, at the spectacle exposed by the withdrawal of the iron 
curtain, we are searching for ourselves. We now see that the curtain 
was not only the boundary of our world, but the contour of our own 
minds, a boundary of our own creation, defining the conceivable and 
delimiting the visible. In a world undivided between communism and 
capitalism, how will we define ourselves? Where will our new bounda-
ries be? 
As if to confirm Hegel's derivation of idealist metaphysics from the 
experience of contingency, many observers have turned to Hegel for 
aid in accounting for communism's unforeseen collapse and in imagin-
ing the world to follow. This review essay examines two such Hege-
lian responses to the events of 1989, The End of History and the Last 
Man by Francis Fukuyama5 and Civil Society and Political Theory by 
Jean Cohen6 and Andrew Arato.1 
Fukuyama reads the collapse of communism as the millenarian tri-
umph of liberalism and the end of meaningful struggle over values in 
international politics. Following Marx' famous claim to have inverted 
3. See id. at 202. 
Thus, then, with the process of explaining, we see the ebb and flow of change, which was 
formerly characteristic of the sphere of appearance, and lay outside the inner world, finding 
its way into the region of the supersensible itself. Our consciousness, however, has passed 
from the inner being as an object over to understanding on the other side, and finds the 
changing process there. 
Id. 
4. Id. at 212-13. 
5. Resident consultant at the Rand Corporation. 
6. Associate Professor of Political Theory at Columbia University. 
7. Andrew Arato is Professor of Sociology at the New School for Social Research. 
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the Hegelian dialectic, 8 Fukuyama sets out to show that to discredit 
Marx' philosophy of history is to vindicate Hegel's. Fukuyama's por-
trayal of Hegel as the prophet of liberalism is notable for the interest it 
has excited rather than for the agreement it commands or deserves. 
Part II of this essay explains this notoriety by reference to the con-
vergence of two developments: a gradual shift in the public function 
of the American intellectual from engineer to ideologue, coinciding 
with the ideological void suddenly created across the American polit-
ical spectrum by the mutually entailed collapse of communism and 
obsolescence of cold war liberalism. Both developments have opened 
America to the influence of European political thought, which main-
tains a lively engagement with Hegel. 
Unfortunately, by caricaturing Hegel as little more than a cold-war 
liberal, Fukuyama deprives him of much of his ability to fill the ideo-
logical void left in the cold war's wake. Part III shows that the liberal 
values Fukuyama finds implicit in Hegel lose much of their content 
when removed from the context of the cold war. Fukuyama claims 
that an innate human drive for recognition, discovered by Hegel, has 
dictated the triumph of capitalism and liberal democracy over com-
munism. Yet Hegel warned that the demand for recognition could not 
be met merely by freeing markets or limiting states. Recognition re-
quired not only private property, but also social insurance sustaining a 
network of civil association. Moreover, Hegel warned, such a strategy 
of insulating civil society from market competition could not be uni-
versalized without interfering with the functioning of the .market. 
Hence, Hegelian political theory suggests that recognition demands 
more than cold war liberalism and occasions intractable conflict. 
Rather than initiating the ideological innovation we will need to con-
front these challenges, The End of History denies its necessity. 
Civil Society and Political Theory, though destined by its density 
and bulk to be much less read, is significantly more responsive to the 
normative restlessness of Fukuyama's readers. In this volume, Arato 
and Cohen identify the collapse of communism with the revolt of what 
Hegel called "civil society" against the state. Part IV explains this 
revival of Hegel's concept by reference to a common frustration exper-
ienced by reform movements on both sides of the iron curtain. Both 
movements reluctantly concluded that seizing the state was both im-
practicable and undesirable. Yet the emergence in Eastern Europe's 
command-economy states of a private sector necessarily distinct from 
the market refuted the cold war's premise that state and market were 
exhaustive categories. To the West's dispirited reformers, Cohen and 
Arato bring welcome tidings: the East's "civil society" strategy proves 
that reform is possible outside the state. 
8. 1 KARL MARX, CAPITAL 25 (Frederick Engels ed. & Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling 
trans., Charles H. Kerr & Company 1915) (1867). 
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If Fukuyama pronounces the death of bipolarity in international 
politics, then Cohen and Arato pronounce its death in domestic poli-
tics. In so doing they reassert the relevance of Hegel's emphasis on 
association as the context for the recognition denied not only by state 
control, but also by consumer "choice." Part V explicates Cohen and 
Arato's strategy for reviving civil society, but reasserts Hegel's warn-
ing that the simultaneous sustenance of markets and civil society for 
some may depend upon an international context in which these insti-
tutions are not available to all. 
Hence, a weakness common to both books is that their appropria-
tion of Hegel is partial and Panglossian. Hegel was not only an ideal-
ist who thought the world was made by thought; he was also a realist 
who knew that social contradiction, for all the artificiality of its ori-
gins, could not be wished away. Hegel, like Adam Smith before him 
and Marx after him, viewed markets as at once liberatory and destruc-
tive. He saw a welfare state, mediated by a rich network of civil asso-
ciation, as an ingenious defense against the destructive tendencies of 
markets, but one that could not be universalized. The nation-state 
could deflect, but not eliminate, the corrosive force of a global market. 
In turning to Hegel to explicate the overthrow of utopian Marxism, we 
risk forgetting how much of Marx - and how little of his utopianism 
- was anticipated by Hegel. 
II. NOT THE END OF IDEOLOGY 
In 1989 and 1990 enough popular periodicals to fill a long footnote 
reported that an obscure official at the State Department had an-
nounced the end of history in the pages of a little known neoconserva-
tive journal.9 What made this event newsworthy? Surely not the end 
9. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, THE NATL. INTEREST, Summer 1989, at 3; 
Allan D. Bloom et al. Responses to Fukuyama, THE NATL. INTEREST, Summer 1989, at 19; 
George F. Will, History's Last Word?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 14, 1989, at 66; Richard Bernstein, 
Judging 'Post-History,' The Theory to End All Theories, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1989, § 4, at 5; 
Timothy Fuller et al., More Responses to Fukuyama, THE NATL. INTEREST, Fall 1989, at 93; 
Michael Novak, Boredom, Virtue, and Democratic Capitalism, COMMENTARY, Sept. 1989, at 34; 
John Elson, Has History Come to an End?, TIME, Sept. 4, 1989, at 57; Strobe Talbott, The Begin-
ning of Nonsense, TIME, Sept. 11, 1989, at 39; George Walden, Is the End of History Really 
Nigh?, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Sept. 14, 1989, at 20; Charles Krauthammer, ... Is History History?, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1989, at A31; Time to Call History a Day?, THE EcONOMJST, Sept. 16, 
1989, at 48; Bob Sipchen, D.C Abuzz Over Theory That the End is Near. L.A. TIMES, Sept. 21, 
1989, § V, at l; Samuel P. Huntington, Repent/ The End Is Not Near. WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 
1989, at B3; M.G. Lord, What to Do When History Ends: Try Shopping, NEWSDAY, Sept. 24, 
1989, at 9; Henry Allen, The End. Or Is It?: Francis Fukuyama and The Schism Over His Ism, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1989, at Cl; Rae Corelli, Stopping Time: Scholars Debate Whether His· 
tory Has Ended, MAcLEAN'S, Oct. 2, 1989, at 56; Les Firestein, The Trouble Was, History Kept 
Piling Up, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 2, 1989, § l, at 15; Jonathan Alter, The Intellectual Hula Hoop: Why 
the hyping of 'The End of History' says more about Washington than the theory itself. NEWS· 
WEEK, Oct. 9, 1989, at 39; James Atlas, What Is Fukuyama Saying? And to Whom ls He Saying 
It?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1989, § 6, at 38, 40; John Gray, The End of History - or of Liber· 
alism?, NATL. REv., Oct. 27, 1989, at 33; Stephen Budiansky, The End is Not Near. U.S. NEWS 
& WORLD REP., Oct. 30, 1989, at 26; Paul Blumberg, ls this the End?, NEWSDAY, Nov. 11, 
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of the cold war which, though newsworthy enough, was, with the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, plain for all to see. No, the man-bites-dog aspect of 
the story was the official's celebration of the collapse of communism in 
the millenarian language that Marxists might have used to celebrate 
its triumph. While most Americans read the Eastern European rejec-
tion of communism as the ultimate refutation of Marx, Francis 
Fukuyama saw it as the ultimate vindication of the thinker best known 
to Americans as Marx' mentor, Hegel. 
Although the oddity lay partly in Fukuyama's reclaiming Hegel 
for capitalism, there was a deeper anomaly: For what, at its moment 
of triumph, did capitalism need Hegel? Thus, the real oddity lay in 
Fukuyama's effort to invoke capitalism in support of a tradition of 
philosophical history more commonly associated with capitalism's 
critique. 
To appreciate fully this anomaly we have to go back a generation. 
To the young scholars who peopled American universities in the wake 
of World War II, the twin enemies of fascism and communism embod-
ied the dangers of ideology. Not the self-conscious aesthetes described 
by Fitzgerald a generation earlier, 10 nor the restless beats Richard 
Farifia would later evoke, 11 these were veterans, hardheaded practical 
men, used to getting with the program, getting the job done, taking 
orders, and taking charge.12 They took up posts as disciplined aca-
demics rather than intellectuals, convinced that theory merely excused 
inaction, that ideology exploited inexperience, and that in a democ-
racy dissent implied desertion and endorsed dictatorship. They loved 
conformity but scorned dogma. The global triumph of liberal democ-
racy, they confidently assumed, would mean the end of ideology.13 
Symptomatic of ideology to the postwar American scholar was the 
Europeans' anthropomorphizing of History as the vehicle of imper-
sonal social forces engaged in dialectical struggle on behalf of tran-
scendent ideals. Thus the related enterprises of social theory and 
philosophy of history were ideological enterprises, rationalizing the 
current sacrifice of individual liberty as necessary to the ultimate reali-
1989, at l; End of History, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 13, 1989, at Al8; Richard Bernstein, The End of 
History, Explained for the Second Time, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1989, § 4, at 6; Francis 
Fukuyama, Beyond the End of History: Still the Best Theory for the Bizarre Events of '89, WASH. 
Posr, Dec. 10, 1989, at Cl; Bob Sipchen, Last Words on 'End of History,' Death of Novels, L.A. 
TIMES, Dec. 28, 1989, § E, at l; Francis Fukuyama, A Reply to My Critics, THE NATL. INTER-
Esr, Winter 1989-1990, at 21; Stephen Bronner, Reflections on the End of History, NEW POL., 
Summer 1990, at 111, 112; Alan M. Olson, Glasnost and Enlightenment, PHIL. TODAY, Summer 
1990, at 99; Kenneth W. Thompson, History as End Point or New Beginnings, MEDITERRANEAN 
Q., Winter 1990, at 111. 
10. F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THIS SIDE OF PARADISE (1920). 
11. RICHARD FARINA, BEEN DOWN So LoNG IT LooKS LIKE UP To ME (1966). 
12. GARRY WILLS, NIXON AGONisrES: THE CRISIS OF THE SELF-MADE MAN 507-22 
(1970). 
13. DANIEL BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY (1960). 
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zation of a wholly chimerical collective freedom. 14 According to these 
self-assured officer-professors, ideology was a peculiarly archaic and 
European kind of softheadedness, a sort of old-world corruption from 
which hardboiled Americans were blessedly free. 15 For the consensus 
historians Louis Hartz,16 Daniel Boorstin,17 and Arthur Schlesinger, 18 
America had always been a Lockean state of nature - naturally abun-
dant, naturally egalitarian, naturally individualistic, and innately lib-
eral without need of philosophical reflection or political debate. To 
theorize in the arcane rhetoric of critical philosophy was suspiciously 
un-American. An honest man had no need for such finery - plain 
folks are plain spoken. 
Against this background, the most natural reading of the Berlin 
Wall's fall was that the end of communism represented the long-
awaited end of ideology and, by extension, the bankrupt enterpri,se of 
philosophical history. A global acceptance of liberalism, capitalism, 
and democracy was imminent. No longer would politics engage mat-
ters of principle; no longer would leaders consign their opponents to 
the ashheap of history. No longer deluded by ideology, everyone 
would now proceed with the prosaic business of refining techniques for 
implementing the new consensus. 
The discrediting of ideology is not only a predictable American 
reading of communism's collapse, it is very nearly Fukuyama's read-
ing. Hence the puzzle: Why announce the end of ideology as the tri-
umph of a particular ideology, liberal-democratic-capitalism? Why 
describe the abandonment of teleological history as the telos toward 
which all history tended? And why did this repackaging of the con-
ventional wisdom in the gaudy wrapper of idealist philosophy stir such 
excitement? What, in short, does Fukuyama's succe's-de-scandale re-
veal about the post-cold war predicament of political thought? 
I think we can account for Fukuyama's rhetoric and its reception 
in light of nine developments. Three involve changes in the American 
political-intellectual milieu since the original articulation of the end-
of-ideology thesis. The remaining six are consequences of the collapse 
of communism itself. 
First and foremost, the events of 1989 came twenty years too late 
to rescue the end-of-ideology thesis. Postwar universities had staked 
an enormous claim to public investment as inculcators of consensus 
14. Three expressions of this point of view are LEONARD KRIEGER, THE GERMAN IDEA OF 
FREEDOM (1957); BERNARD YACK, THE LONGING FOR TOTAL REVOLUTION: PHILOSOPHIC 
SOURCES OF SOCIAL DISCONTENT FROM ROUSSEAU TO MARX AND NIETZSCHE (1986); and 
Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR EssAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969). Berlin, though 
not American, was widely read and admired here. 
15. WILLS, supra note 12, at 507-17. 
16. LoUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955). 
17. DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1953). 
18. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE VITAL CENTER (1949). 
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and servants of an uncontroversial national interest. Science, lan-
guages, area studies, even psychology - all came to be seen as defense 
research. But the very policy relevance of such research brought its 
objectivity into question once consensus over the goals of public policy 
broke down. As the Vietnam War eroded that consensus, draft-age 
students increasingly saw universities not as public servants, but 
merely as government agents. 19 The ensuing political confrontation 
incubated challenges to the objectivity of every academic discipline. 
Suddenly the pragmatism of Kuhn20 and Wittgenstein21 could be in-
voked to undermine the epistemological claims of positivist social sci-
ence and the social authority of natural science. Consensus history 
faced challenges on two fronts: intellectual historians advanced a new 
interpretation of antebellum American political thought as ideological, 
even paranoid,22 while social historians attempted to recover the sup-
pressed visions of history's losers. 23 . 
If even academic discourse is treated as inherently ideological, a 
fortiori there can be no such thing as nonideological politics. Hence, 
in an academic milieu where reference to "truth" has become an index 
of naivete, any attempted revival of the end-of-ideology thesis - no 
matter how well confirmed by events - would have been dead on 
arrival. 
Second, while epistemological relativism drew most of its support 
from the academic left, even advocates of free enterprise have long 
since dispensed with the claim to be nonideological. Indeed, we can 
understand the neoconservative movement as an imitative response to 
the New Left's success in "infiltrating" popular culture. The intellec-
tual circles in which Fukuyama travels - his book jacket sports 
blurbs from Charles Krauthammer, George Will, Irving Kristal, and 
Alan Bloom - share the academic left's view of intellectual activity as 
ideological advocacy. When a neoconservative describes markets as 
the expression of an ideology, he means to dignify them as intellectu-
ally serious and principled. 
19. This identification of universities with the machinery of war might seem paradoxical 
given their function for draft-age students as safe havens from military service. Yet student 
deferments themselves reflected the view that the university was performing a vital defense func-
tion. Moreover, as universities sought to control disruptive protest by expelling students -
thereby depriving them of student deferments - they became extensions of the Selective Service 
System. 
20. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). 
21. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 
1953). 
22. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
(1967); DAVID B. DAVIS, THE SLAVE POWER CONSPIRACY AND THE PARANOID STYLE (1969); 
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN PoLmcs AND OTHER EssAYS 
(1966); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969). 
23. See PETER A. NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE "OBJECTIVITY QUESTION" AND 
THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION 440-45 (1988). A key example is EUGENE D. GENO-
VESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL (1974). 
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Third, if the "end-of-ideology thesis" is less academically respect-
able than it once was, philosophical history has become more respecta-
ble, so long as philosophy is now understood as ethics rather than 
metaphysics. The stone first rippling the stagnant pond of postwar 
American philosophy was Rawls' rejuvenation of Kantian Ethics.24 
In one stroke, Rawls refuted the commonplace that liberalism had ob-
soleted normative philosophy and restored the relevance of the Kant-
ian critical tradition to English-speaking philosophy. Waves rippled 
from this point of impact in three directions. First, in normative polit-
ical theory, neo-Kantian liberalism begat its neo-Hegelian communi-
tarian critique.25 Second, even as neo-Kantian ethics were being 
criticized, they were also being applied in the sphere of international 
relations. 26 Third, in descriptive political science, Kant's prediction 
that the proliferation of liberal democracy would yield "perpetual 
peace"27 got a second look. 28 Perhaps it was only a matter of time 
before this neo-Kantian philosophy of history would provoke a neo-
Hegelian response. In this sense, Fukuyama's pop-Hegelian self-help 
24. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (H. J. Paton 
trans., Harper & Row, Publishers Inc., 3d ed. 1964) (1785); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUS-
TICE (1971). Rawls' resuscitation of Kantian ethics affected legal scholarship most visibly in the 
figure of Ronald Dworkin, but also through such diverse figures as Frank Michelman, Bruce 
Ackerman, George Fletcher, and others. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND 
THE CONSTITUTION (1977); BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 
(1980); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); George P. Fletcher, Fairness 
and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, 
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. 
REV. 1165 (1967). 
25. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (2d ed. 1984); 
MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); ROBERTO M. UNGER, 
KNOWLEDGE AND PoLmcs (1975); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF 
PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983); CHARLES TAYLOR, Atomism, in 2 PHILOSOPHY AND THE 
HUMAN SCIENCES 185 (1985); Michael Walzer, Philosophy and Democracy, 9 POL. THEORY 379 
(1981). Liberals have met this critique largely by incorporation rather than refutation. See WILL 
KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE (1989); Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, 
Politics, and the Claims of Community, 90 MICH. L. REV. 685 (1992); John Rawls, Justice as 
Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223 (1985). 
26. CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1979); AL· 
LEN BUCHANAN, SECESSION: THE MORALITY OF POLITICAL DIVORCE FROM FORT SUMTER 
TO LITHUANIA AND QUEBEC (1991); KYMLICKA, supra note 25; HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: 
SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1980); FERNANDO R. TES6N, HUMAN· 
ITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY (1988). 
27. IMMANUEL KANT, Perpetual Peace, in KANT ON HISTORY 85 (Lewis W. Beck et al. ed. 
& trans., Bobbs-Merrill 1963) (1795). 
28. See Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, 12 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 205, 323 (1983); Michael W. Doyle, Liberalism and World Politics, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
1151 (1986); Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. 
INTL. L. 46 (1992); David Garnham, War-Proneness, War-Weariness and Regime Type: 1916· 
1980, 23 J. PEACE RES. 279 (1986); R. J. Rummel, Libertarianism and Intemational Violence, 27 
J. Conf. Resol. 27 (1983); R. J. Rummel, On Vincent's View of Freedom and International Con· 
flict, 31 INTL. STUD. Q. 113 (1987); Fernando R. Tes6n, The Kantian Theory of International 
Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 53 (1992). 
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manual for statesmen is the frothy crest of a more substantial swell 
that has been building for twenty years. 
In sum, postwar America has experienced a broad and gradual 
transformation in the cultural function of the intellectual, from techni-
cal problem-solver to normative theory-builder. Yet the American in-
tellectual's difficulty is that she finds herself, in Pierre Schlag's 
charming phrase, "normative and nowhere to go,"29 advocating causes 
without rebels. · 
The Eastern European revolution has suddenly alleviated this defi-
cit of disorder. The lifting of the iron curtain seems like an invitation 
for philosophers to don costumes and step onto the stage of world 
history. 
First, the sudden and siilultaneous collapse of the Soviet Union 
and its satellites calls for global explanation by reference to large-scale 
social forces. We expect an aggregation of individual decisions to lead 
to incremental change. Steady erosion might precipitate sudden 
change in a single country and, perhaps, influence the long-run sur-
vival prospects of regimes in other countries. But the simultaneous 
collapse of nine regimes, the emergence by secession of twenty new 
states, the reunification of the state that started two world wars, the 
unification of Europe, the defusing of the nuclear confrontation that 
has terrorized the world for four decades, the democratization of doz-
ens of states in Latin America and Asia - these are unquestionably 
world-historical events demanding systematic explanation. 30 
Second, the exorcism of the communist bogeyman has cleared Eu-
ropean critical philosophy from suspicion of being an enemy agent, 
and Fukuyama's neoconservative pop-Hegel signifies continental phi-
losophy's new innocuousness. No longer will every invocation of 
Hegel and Kant be read as the coded plans for Soviet invasion. Now it 
is possible to read European critical philosophy for its own sake and 
judge it on its own terms. 
Third, for those seeking to understand Germany and the "Central 
European"31 world emerging in its lengthening shadow, engagement 
with the continental tradition is not just possible, but necessary. East-
ern European intellectuals conceived their struggle to liberate civil so-
ciety from the state in such Hegelian terms not only because that 
29. Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167 (1990). 
30. Fukuyama appropriately quotes Hegel's comments on the French Revolution: 
We stand at the gates of an important epoch, a time of ferment, when spirit moves forward 
in a leap, transcends its previous shape and takes on a new one. All the mass of previous 
representations, concepts, and bonds linking our world together are dissolving and collaps-
ing like a dream picture. A new phase of the spirit is preparing itself. Philosophy especially 
has to welcome its appearance and acknowledge it .... 
P. 39 (quoting G.W.F. Hegel, Lecture (Sept. 18, 1806)). 
31. See generally Timothy G. Ash, Does Central Europe Exist?, N.Y. REv. BooKS, Oct. 9, 
1986, at 45. 
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language suited their surroundings, but also because it was part of 
their surroundings. It represented a way of reestablishing membership 
in, and enlisting the support of, a European intellectual community. 
The fragmentation of the Eastern bloc was as integrative as it was dis-
integrative, reflecting an impulse to join Europe economically, politi-
cally, and culturally.32 Fuk.uyama's millenarian message resonates 
with the American mythology of manifest destiny; but his continental 
idiom hints the end of the American century. 
Fourth, the lifting of the iron curtain has enabled unprecedented 
intellectual exchange between East and West, which will ultimately 
prove to be a two-way street. It is tempting to view the squadrons of 
American academics scrambling eastward to observe, advise, explain, 
and endorse the new postcommunist regimes as conquering armies, 
colonial governors sent to civilize the natives. But they come from a 
country in the grip of governmental gridlock and political cynicism, a 
country that has lost faith in the welfare state yet has imagined no 
alternative to replace it. American academics are invited to Eastern 
Europe to teach and prescribe, but they go in order to learn and listen. 
The consequence of this migration is less likely to be the defeat of 
European theory by American pragmatism than the Europeanization 
of American social thought. Cohen and Arato's Left-Hegelian ac-
count of the Eastern European revolution represents this latter trend. 
Fifth, channels of influence have opened for American intellectuals 
in Eastern Europe largely because of the power of their East European 
counterparts. The revolt of civil society against the state celebrated by 
Cohen and Arato has delegitimized, if it has not always dis-
empowered, bureaucratic elites. Unlike familiar revolutionary move-
ments that mobilized armies and supplanted state authority as a result 
of military struggle, the anticommunist revolution engendered no 
counterbureaucracy. It was, to an unprecedented extent, a discursive 
revolution, fortified by espresso rather than Molotov cocktails, fought 
not with blows, but mit Schlag. Hence, almost in spite of themselves, 
East European intellectuals find themselves sucked into the power vac-
uum they helped create, ironically envied by their pampered, prosper-
ous colleagues to the West. 
A final reason for the post-cold war return of philosophy is its util-
ity here, as well as there. Contrary to the faith of the officer-profes-
sors, the circumstances in which politics can be reduced to technical 
problem-solving are the exception rather than the rule. World War II 
was such a circumstance, in which a solidarity unprecedented in 
American history banished politics and joined Americans from Iowa 
City to Iwo Jima to defeat fascism. After the war, Americans strug-
gled to sustain that nourishing solidarity by transferring their enmity 
32. For more on this theme see Guyora Binder, The Case for Self-Determination, 29 STAN. J. 
INTL. L. (forthcoming 1993). 
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to the red menace. The newly coined epithet "totalitarianism" eased 
this transition by associating together ideologies of the left and the 
right. 33 It was in this prolonged war against totalitarianism that liber-
alism, democracy, and capitalism took on uncontroversial and 
unanalyzed meaning as rallying cries. 34 When a society's ends are 
supplied by a foreign threat, ideology is unnecessary and military mo-
bilization supplants political mobilization. With the lifting of 
America's long state of siege, however, social choice is no longer, to 
paraphrase Michael Dukakis, about means alone, but about ends. 
Now that we have made the world safe for liberalism, democracy, and 
capitalism, we must decide what these fine phrases mean. In the inevi-
tably political work of deciding which rights will go with what forms 
of public participation and representation and with what kind of mar-
ket, we will need a new birth - if not of ideology, at least of ideas. 
Here the neoconservative Fukuyama, content to savor victory in 
the last war, cannot help us. And here, insist neoradicals Cohen and 
Arato, the cold war's real victors, the peoples of Eastern Europe, have 
something to teach us. 
Ill. NOT THE END OF POLITICS 
This section explicates and critiques Fukuyama's claim that his-
tory is over. It shows that Fukuyama's faith in the necessity and 
perpetuity of the present stems from a commitment to a static human 
nature quite at odds with Hegel's historicism. Fukuyama's naturalism 
expresses itself in an argument that all political conflict is behind us, 
enabled by three rhetorical sleights of hand: (1) reading Hegel's dia-
33. Actually, the term totalitarianism seems to have been introduced by its enthusiasts as an 
accolade. See Benito Mussolini, Speech of June 22, 1925, in 21 OPERA OMNIA 362 (1952-1963), 
quoted in LEONARD SCHAPIRO, TOTALITARIANISM 13 (1971) ("Feroce Volunta totalitaria"); 
Giovanni Gentile, The Philosophical Basis of Fascism, 6 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 290, 299 (1928) ("To-
talitarian scope of [Fascism]"); Carl Schmitt, quoted in SCHAPIRO, supra, at 13 (national social-
ism calls for "totalitarian state"). The term quickly became an epithet, however. For discussion 
of its usage see SCHAPIRO, supra, at 13-15 and Benjamin R. Barber, Conceptual Foundations of 
Totalitarianism, in CARL J. FRIEDRICH ET AL., TOTALITARIANISM IN PERSPECTIVE: THREE 
VIEWS 3-20 (1969). The most influential formulations, linking Naziism and Communism, are 
those of Carl J. Friedrich and Hannah Arendt. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TO-
TALITARIANISM 305-479 (1951); CARL J. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND 
DEMOCRACY 1 (1941) (parallel between Naziism and Communism); id. at 170-71, 260, 263, 291, 
343 ("Totalitarianism" described); CARL J. FRIEDRICH & ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, TOTALITAR-
IAN DICTATORSHIP AND AUTOCRACY (1956); Carl J. Friedrich, The Evolving Theory and Prac-
tice of Totalitarian Regimes, in TOTALITARIANISM IN PERSPECTIVE, supra at 123; Carl J. 
Friedrich, The Unique Character of Totalitarian Society, in TOTALITARIANISM 41 (Carl J. 
Friedrich ed., 1964). 
34. Bruce Ackerman makes a similar point in inverted form: 
Given the Marxists' aim, it made sense for them to use capitalism as an umbrella term. 
After all, they were trying to convince us that all non-Communist systems were fundamen-
tally bad. But it is wrong for liberal revolutionaries to carry over the capitalist label into 
their own thinking. Rather than rejecting capitalism for communism, we must recognize 
that there are many capitalisms, some much better than others. 
BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION 34-35 (1992). 
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lectic as a movement toward agreement rather than understanding, (2) 
finding agreement on values of such indeterminate scope as to encom-
pass the entire political spectrum, and (3) confining politics to the de-
bate over the organization of government rather than that of society or 
culture. 
A. The End of History? 
Fukuyama shares the conventional wisdom that capitalism is the 
most efficient system for allocating resources and liberal democracy is 
the political regime that best recognizes the dignity of all citizens. 
What sets Fukuyama apart from the mainstream are his views that 
these regimes are preferred because they reflect truths of human na-
ture; that their truth makes their acceptance as inevitable as the ac-
ceptance of scientific claims; that the mechanism by which human 
nature compels the acceptance of capitalism, liberalism, and democ-
racy is the struggle for recognition first conceived by Hegel; that the 
widespread acceptance· of liberalism, capitalism, and democracy will 
eliminate most international conflict; and that such peace is what 
Hegel meant by the end of history. 
Fukuyama's starting point is Hegel's famous dialectic of master 
and slave in the Phenomenology of Mind (pp. 146-52). Two men en-
counter each other in a state of nature and engage in a struggle to the 
death, not over any natural good like food, but for the already cultural 
value of prestige, or recognition. Realizing that the death of either 
antagonist precludes the recognition of both, one submits to the other. 
Yet the victor, Hegel argued, still cannot be satisfied with recognition 
wrung from a helpless captive - meaningful recognition can only 
come from one recognized in return. The slave, on the other hand, 
begins the arduous process of winning recognition for himself and the 
master by mastering himself in the self-discipline of labor.35 
History, according to Fukuyama's Hegel, is the narrative of move-
ment from the disequilibrium of unequal recognition to the stability of 
equal recognition (pp. 192-98). Yet the motor of history is thymos, the 
individual desire to maximize recognition Hegel depicted in his origi-
nal allegory of the fight to the death. As there is strength in numbers, 
the pursuit of this individual desire leads to the dominance of military 
elites in society. Rivalry among elites engenders the competitive mo-
bilization of all available resources for war. This competition leads to 
scientific innovation, a cumulative process because the genie of knowl-
edge cannot be stuffed back into the bottle (pp. 73-75, 82-88). The 
competitive mobilization of resources for war also leads to innovation 
in what we might call, following Foucault, "technologies of power." 
35. HEGEL, supra note 1, at 229-40. 
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Ironically, then, we owe society's movement toward the unheroic val-
ues of economic and bureaucratic rationality to a struggle for honor. 
More specifically, argues Fukuyama, military competition for rec-
ognition propels society toward capitalism and democracy. Why is 
capitalism historically necessary? For Marx, who coined the term, 
capitalism meant free alienability of labor, commodity production for 
private accumulation of wealth, and sufficient accumulation of wealth 
to enable industrialization. 36 Yet Marx' assumption that industrializa-
tion required free alienability of labor and private accumulation of 
capital was ironically refuted by the success of communist states in 
developing industry.37 Hence, "capitalism" proved to be a mythic be-
ing long before its triumph. 
Fukuyama's capitalism seems to mean nothing more than alloca-
tion of resources by competitive pricing (pp. 44, 90-94). Even though 
markets long preceded industrialization, in Fukuyama's eyes they 
have become necessary only with the advent of the postindustrial in-
formation economy. The production of complex, computerized tech-
nology involving thousands of component parts requires cost 
calculations beyond the capacity of central planners. Thus, only in the 
age of Star Wars have markets demonstrated their military superiority 
(pp. 75-76, 92-96). 
To account fully for the inevitability of markets, however, 
Fukuyama argues that we have to factor in the inevitable development 
of democracy. Industrialization, enabling the mass production of 
weaponry, advantages the military elite willing to widen the circle of 
recognition and arm the masses. Recruiting the remaining populace 
into the industrial-commercial economy needed to sustain modern 
warfare requires the inculcation of basic literacy, a common language, 
work discipline, future-orientation, and all the other traits we associate 
with modernity. With the resulting advent of a citizen army, universal 
education, widespread literacy, national circulation of commodities 
and currency, a popular press, and an informed, articulate public opin-
ion, we find ourselves in the nation-state (pp. 267-69). 
Conscripting, coordinating, and motivating the efforts of entire 
populations, nation-states cannot long avoid empowering and consult-
ing them (pp. 115-17, 205). Because the nation-state relies only on the 
mobilized portion of its populace, it tends to condition political recog-
nition on participation in the national culture that enables mobiliza-
36. See GERALD A. COHEN, KARL MARX'S THEORY OF HISTORY: A DEFENCE 64-69, 80-
83 (1978); Guyora Binder, What's Left?, 69 TEXAS L. REv. 1985, 2002 (1991). 
37. We might add that industrialization preceded the full freeing of laborers in England by 
100 years. See ROBERT J. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR 115, 243 n.36 (1991) 
(noting that criminal enforcement of labor contracts persisted in Britain until the 1870s). Brit-
ain's first heavy industry, the Scottish coal mines, used laborers who were bound for life, bought 
and sold. DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, 
1770-1823, at 490 (1975) (discussion of case involving Scottish colliers). 
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tion. Although more inclusive than the federal state, the nation-state 
is not all-inclusive. By identifying with a victorious nation, every citi-
zen can be recognized as a master. Yet, because the majoritarian mas-
tery to which nationalists aspire is exclusive of cultural minorities, it is 
still, Fukuyama asserts, instable (p. 266). Only liberal democracy, by 
replacing the desire for superior recognition with the desire for equal 
recognition, enables mutual recognition among fully democratic 
states, thereby bringing the thymotic dialectic to an end (pp. 200-01). 
What is the link between democracy and markets? With the de-
mocratization of government, argues Fukuyama, government plan-
ning becomes less efficient. Fukuyama acknowledges that 
authoritarian states in East Asia have implemented highly successful 
industrial policies (pp. 123-24). But drawing on public choice theory, 
Fukuyama argues that majoritarian public investment and pricing de-
cisions are likely to be redistributive rather than wealth-maximizing 
(pp. 124-25). Thus, not only does military competition democratize 
states, it also moves democracies from centrally planned to market 
economies. Fukuyama points to recent worldwide trends toward de-
mocratization and privatization to confirm his intuitions. 
When "liberal democracy" becomes sufficiently widespread, how-
ever, military competition ceases. By eliminating the desire for recog-
nition as superior, Fukuyama insists, liberal democracy eliminates the 
thymotic motivation for war and so switches off the motor of history 
(pp. xx, 260). 
Here Fukuyama offers a variation on the standard argument that 
popular majorities will not agree to bear the brunt of wars for the 
aggrandizement of military elites. Recognizing that nationalism iden-
tifies popular majorities as the military elites who stand to benefit from 
the exploitation of other nations, Fukuyama insists only that suffi-
ciently liberal popular majorities will not go to war. As evidence of 
the pacifying effects of liberal sentiments, Fukuyama cites "a steadily 
decreasing tolerance for violence, death," and "casualties in the war," 
as well as the reduced brutality of punishment, particularly in enforc-
ing military discipline (p. 261). He cites the claims of Michael Doyle 
and other neo-Kantian theorists of international relations that, as an 
empirical matter, no liberal democracies have ever fought each 
other.38 
Finally, Fukuyama reasons that, with the dissipation of thymotic 
motives for war, material incentives will become more important. 
These incentives, however, are likely to discourage warfare in the fu-
ture. With the development of a technology-intensive economy, 
Fukuyama argues, the costs of war outweigh its benefits. Military 
technology is prohibitively expensive, while the land and population 
38. See supra sources cited in note 28. 
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acquired by military conquest add little to the conquering nation's 
wealth. Even raw materials are probably acquired more cheaply by 
purchase than conquest (pp. 261-62). War, Fukuyama concludes, has 
become economically obsolete and is fast becoming thymotically su-
perfluous as well. 
In the coming posthistorical era, Fukuyama predicts, almost all 
states will be pacific liberal democracies, protecting private property, 
permitting allocation of resources by markets, albeit with varying de-
grees of regulation, public investment, and welfare. Roughly similar 
politically and economically, the democracies will remain culturally 
diverse (p. 233). Borrowing a page from such neoconservatives as 
Glazer, Moynihan,39 and Sowell,40 Fukuyama expects these cultural 
differences will determine the relative wealth of nations - those de-
voted to the Protestant ethic or its Confucian analogue will prosper, 
Fukuyama seems sure (pp. xix, 234, 237-38). But cultural competi-
tion, Fukuyama concludes, is not political conflict and so has no 
history.41 
Let's evaluate Fukuyama's argument: Are universal capitalism, 
liberal democracy, and world peace inevitable? Not on the basis of 
Fukuyama's reasoning and not on Hegel's authority. Fukuyama's ar-
guments for the inevitability of universal capitalism and universal 
peace contradict each other. He shows the obsolescence of political 
debate over capitalism, liberalism, and democracy only by defining 
each so vaguely that they are consistent with any plausible policy pre-
scription. Hegel, by contrast, saw democracy and markets as poten-
tially contradictory and judged this tension an intractable source of 
nationalist feeling and international conflict. 
B. Not the End of Ideological Conflict 
Consider first Fukuyama's argument for the inevitability of mar-
kets, capitalism to you. By his account, the economic superiority of 
markets becomes manifest surprisingly late in the day - in states al-
ready democratic or in authoritarian states confronting military rivals 
with postindustrial economies. The first difficulty with his idealist 
analysis is its inability to explain the premature appearance of mar-
kets. A second difficulty is the inherent perversity of what amounts to 
a claim that the economic superiority of markets was revealed by their 
ability to produce Star Wars. Perverse first, because there is still no 
evidence Star Wars would have worked; second, because it is not clear 
we can afford it; and third, because we would be hard put to find a 
39. NATHAN GLAZER & DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, BEYOND THE MELTING POT (2d ed. 
1970). 
40. THOMAS SOWELL, RACE AND EcONOMICS (1975). 
41. P. 61 (history is competition "between socio-economic systems"). 
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more socialized, subsidized, centrally planned, and inefficient sector of 
the American economy than military technology. 
Even assuming that communism collapsed because of the inability 
of planned economies to close the microcircuitry gap, this hardly 
proves the historical inevitability of whatever Fukuyama means by 
capitalism. Because economic performance matters only as a means to 
military victory in Fukuyama's idealist analysis, the case for the neces-
sity of capitalism depends upon the accident of postindustrial technol-
ogy arriving before perpetual peace. If democratization had 
eliminated international military competition before the advent of the 
information age, democracies would have had no thymotic compul-
sion to develop postindustrial technology or to maximize the efficiency 
of their economies. 
Is there perhaps some reason why the spread of democracy must 
await the spread of capitalism? Democracy was obviously possible 
before the information age, but perhaps the postindustrial technology 
developed by capitalist economies nevertheless facilitates democracy.42 
Much might be made of the role of fax machines in thwarting the 
Communists' attempted coup in the Soviet Union. Yet high technol-
ogy has an antidemocratic aspect as well, beyond its obvious utility in 
surveillance. Just as industrialization fostered democracy by making 
the masses militarily and economically valuable, postindustrialization 
may render democracy redundant by confining production - and de-
struction - to a technocratic elite. 
If expensive technology does not necessarily democratize society, 
perhaps the accumulation of wealth in private hands encourages de-
mocracy by creating plural centers of power. Jeane Kirkpatrick's no-
torious claim that authoritarian right-wing dictatorships were more 
vulnerable to democratization than totalitarian socialist dictatorships 
may be so understood.43 Yet Fukuyama rightly concedes that the 
broad distribution of wealth is more important than its invulnerability 
to state control in sowing the seeds of democracy. Socialist regimes in 
Nicaragua and Peru prepared the ground for democracy by redistrib-
uting land, 44 and the first Soviet bloc states to move toward reform, 
Poland and Hungary, had among the most egalitarian distributions of 
wealth in the world. 45 At the same time, military regimes serving at 
the pleasure of private concentrations of wealth hardly constitute 
pluralism. 
42. See ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM (1983). 
43. Jeane Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships and Double Standards, COMMENTARY, Nov. 1979, at 
34, 37. 
44. For Peru, see p. 120. 
45. The ratio of the percentage of GNP earned by the top 20% and that earned by the 
bottom 20% was 3.0 in Hungary and 3.6 in Poland, the lowest reported. U.N. Development 
Programme, Human Development Report 1991, tbl. 17, at 152-53, tbl. 38, at 186. 
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One might, taking inspiration from Hegel, argue that state control 
of society precludes the private association needed to form democratic 
will. 46 But then one would have to ask, as Cohen and Arato do, 
whether placing society at the mercy of unrestricted market forces 
does not equally preclude sociability (p. 24). That perpetual peace 
must await global democratization in no way implies that perpetual 
peace must await global capitalism. 
Even if perpetual peace required the prior spread of capitalism, 
that would not imply capitalism's permanence. Once perpetual peace 
has been achieved, Fukuyama's thymotic analysis gives democracies 
no compelling reason to retain markets. It is not enough to argue that 
the genie of high technology cannot be restored to the bottle, since the 
motivation to deploy the genie has, ex hypothesi, disappeared. 
Fukuyama's claims for the military necessity of capitalism and the pa-
cific destiny of democracy must ultimately collide, "necessitating" 
only an indeterminate future. 
At this point, Fukuyama has a tempting reply available, but one 
that reveals the essentially circular quality of his argume!J.t. The 
tempting reply is that perpetual peace follows the global spread not 
just of democracy, but of liberal democracy. And liberal democracy 
by definition requifes capitalism. 
Now the latter statement is true if we accept Fukuyama's vacuous 
definitions of these terms. Fukuyama, as we have seen, uses capitalism 
to mean nothing more than the tolerance of some market pricing and 
some private property. Liberalism he defines as limited to the protec-
tion of property, worship, and speech (pp. 42-44). If capitalism means 
nothing more than the protection of some property, and liberalism 
protects property, than ipso facto liberal democracy must be capitalist. 
But neither of these definitions suffices for Fukuyama's purposes. 
He is out to convince us that real debate over political values is over 
because the combination of capitalism, liberalism, and democracy 
uniquely satisfies the human craving for equal recognition. Capital-
ism, appearing as an economic weapon in Fukuyama's narrative of the 
combat for recognition, must be allocatively efficient. Liberalism, ap-
pearing as a corrective to the intolerant, chauvinist tendencies of de-
mocracy, must be antidiscriminatory. And democracy, representing 
recognition, must be meaningfully participatory. And these different 
purposes place Fukuyama's three principles at odds, guaranteeing a 
future of controversy and contingency. 
Thus Fukuyama's bland syllogism finding capitalism included by 
definition in liberalism is vitiated by the ambiguity of property. When 
we associate capitalism with the protection of property, we think pri-
marily of the right to alienate or "market" property that enables its 
46. SHLOMO AVINERI, HEGEL'S THEORY OF THE MODERN STATE 161-67 (1972). 
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efficient allocation. But when we assqciate liberalism with the protec-
tion of property, we may be more concerned with securing the right to 
acquire and enjoy property. Indeed, Hegel saw property as a medium 
for the expression of personality and therefore crucial to realizing the 
individual dignity we often associate with liberalism.47 Needless to 
say, our ability to invest property with personality may be undermined 
rather than enhanced by its alienability.48 
In any case, liberalism's prominent role in Fukuyama's thymotic 
narrative rests on its commitment to equality rather than property. 
And by limiting "private discrimination" and redistributing wealth, 
the vindication of equality may well collide with the protection of 
property. Fukuyama attempts to cabin this conflict by declaring liber-
alism committed to the elimination of only "conventional" inequality 
- unequal treatment - rather than "natural" inequality, or inequal-
ity of condition (pp. 290-91). Yet fully eliminating conventional 
sources of inequality would require eliminating inherited wealth, for-
bidding discretionary gifts of human capital ranging from education to 
affection, and defining and rewarding achievement without regard to 
discretionary - and hence "conventional" - consumer preferences. 
So even Fukuyama's equal treatment principle, unreservedly applied, 
threatens to eliminate private disposition and market allocation of re-
sources. Moreover, Fukuyama admits that liberalism is also compati-
ble with an unspecified measure of pure redistribution aimed at 
correcting "natural" inequality (pp. 44, 291-93). 
Next, consider the potential tension between democracy and mar-
kets. Fukuyama defines democracy as the right to vote and participate 
in politics (p. 43). We typically view at least some political participa-
tion rights - voting rights paradigmatically - as subject to restraints 
on alienation and accumulation.49 To the extent we view any entitle-
ment as crucial to political participation - education, service in the 
military, ownership of productive property in the republican tradition 
- we may wish to place them outside the market.50 Similarly, to the 
extent we view any allocative decision as political, we may wish to 
take it outside the market. To that end, some have argued that the 
workplace is within the domain of politics and should be managed 
democratically. 
Finally, recall that, in Fukuyama's narrative, liberal democracy is 
just a means to maximize recognition. Yet Hegel emphasized the ten-
47. G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT§§ 41-71 (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Uni-
versity Press 1967) (1820). 
48. Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theo-
rem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669 (1979); Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. 
REV. 957 (1982). 
49. William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1350-56 (1991). 
50. See Richard D. Parker, The Pasto/Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42 Omo ST. 
L.J. 223 (1981). 
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dency of markets to frustrate recognition by eroding the communities 
within which recognition must necessarily occur.51 He suggested the 
need for associations - intermediate between the individual and the 
state - to confer social identity on individuals, aggregate them into 
politically effective and articulate interest groups, and provide social 
insurance. 52 Social insurance itself is an accumulation restraint, 53 
while membership in an association may involve noncommodifiable 
entitlements. Thus, recognition is a fourth value endorsed by 
Fukuyama that may justify limiting the alienation and accumulation 
of property. 
The emergent ideological "consensus" apparently requires com-
mitment to the potentially incompatible values of allocative efficiency, 
personal dignity, equality, democracy, and community. Whether 
Fukuyama's talismanic label of liberal democracy is capacious enough 
to encompass all these values is ultimately beside the point. The im-
portant point is that different resolutions of the tensions among these 
values would yield vastly different societies, so that important ques-
tions of policy and principle remain ours to debate and to decide. 
C. Not the End of International Conflict 
If ideological conflict is not yet obsolete, neither is international 
conflict. The malleability of Fukuyama's concept of liberal democracy 
fatally weakens his empirical claim that liberal democracies cooperate, 
while his prediction of a universal liberal alliance rests on a fundamen-
tal misunderstanding of Hegel's philosophical history. If international 
conflict is driven by the yearning for recognition, Hegel gives us no 
warrant for expecting the universal satisfaction of that yearning. Even 
if liberal democracies do tend to ally, Hegel denied that any such alli-
ance could become universal. 
Fukuyama's empirical case for perpetual peace relies on the pro-
gressive development of humanitarian values and the rarity of war be-
tween liberal democracies. The first datum need not detain us. 
Insofar as it is a recent development, humanitarian law is clearly a 
response to the vastly more destructive consequences of warfare in the 
modern era. War now involves more soldiers, more civilians in sup-
port, and more productive enterprises designated for destruction as 
military targets by more potent weaponry than ever. 
The heart of Fukuyama's empirical case for optimism is the com-
51. G.W.F. HEGEL, JENAER REALPHILOSOPHIE: DIE VORLESUNGEN VON 1803-1804, at 
232-39 (1932) {destructive effect of market on community); HEGEL, supra note 47, at §§ 253, 255 
(community required for recognition). 
52. HEGEL, supra note 47, at §§ 302, 303, 308, § 290 add. (political voice); §§ 245, 253 
(social insurance). 
53. Simon, supra note 49, at 1346. Often social insurance is inalienable as well. See, e.g., 42 
U.S.C. § 407(a) (1988) (preventing assignability of future social security benefits). 
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manly voiced claim that liberal democracies, though belligerent to-
ward their ideological opponents, have never fought one another. This 
claim faces three related difficulties. First, to determine whether lib-
eral democrats cooperate we must distinguish liberal democracy from 
other ideologies, which Fukuyama seems unable to do. Is liberalism 
about consumer choice, equal opportunity, or freedom of expression? 
Some commentators classify Wilhelmine Germany as a liberal democ-
racy, 54 while Fukuyama implies that even contemporary Germany 
might not qualify as liberal because it punishes hate speech. 55 How do 
we classify semisocialist Sweden? Pseudorevolutionary Rumania? Be-
leaguered but bloodthirsty Croatia? The once and future communist 
regime in Lithuania?56 Fujimori's intermittent dictatorship in Peru? 
What about the popularly elected socialisms of Allende, Arbenz, and 
Ortega, all subverted by the United States?57 If we laud these as lib-
eral democracies, can we save the perpetual peace claim by classifying 
the extralegal American responses as departures from democracy? 
Second, as the example of Sandinista Nicaragua reminds us, the 
claim that liberal democracies do not go to war has a circular quality. 
Inasmuch as warring states inevitably violate humanitarian law by 
slaughtering civilians, usually suspend civil liberties while delegating 
political authority to the military, and often face internal subversion, 
war makes states less liberal and less democratic. In addition, war is a 
forensic activity, frequently placing the previous liberality or democ-
racy of contending governments in controversy. No state perfectly 
embodies its own utopian rhetoric, and no situation exposes imperfec-
tions so well as war. 
Third, if we adopt a sufficiently restrictive definition of liberal de-
mocracy to exclude any states that have fought each other, we end up 
with too small a data set to exclude rival hypotheses. Robert Mear-
sheimer points out that the last half century of peace among major 
industrial powers can be as well explained by nuclear deterrence as by 
the prevalence ofliberal democracy, while before World War II liberal 
democracies were too few and too new to generalize about. 58 
54. John J. Mearsheimer, Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War. ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 
Aug. 1990, at 35, 47. 
55. Pp. 42-43 (concerns about racism, sexism, and homophobia as political threat to liberal 
rights); p. 294 (freedom of speech and press essential to liberalism, although qualified by excep-
tion for matters "plainly affect[ing] the welfare of the whole community"). See Donald P. Kom-
mers, The Jurisprudence of Free Speech in the United States and the Federal Republic of 
Germany, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 657, 685-86 (1980). 
56. Celestine Bohlen, A New Democracy Votes Communist, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1992, at 
A20; Eleanor Randolph, Lithuanian Communists Gain Legislative Control, WASH. POST, Nov. 
17, 1992, at A27. 
57. See Diana Meyers, Kant's Liberal Alliance, in POLITICAL REALISM AND INTERNA-
TIONAL MORALITY 212, 216 (Kenneth Kipnis & Diana Meyers eds., 1987); Mearsheimer, supra 
note 54, at 47. 
58. Mearsheimer, supra note 54, at 46-47; see also Jack Vincent, Freedom and International 
Conflict: Another Look, 31 INTL. STUD. Q. 103 (1987). 
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Even if Fukuyama's empirical claim about the tendency of liberal 
democracies to cooperate were acceptable, it would not by itself imply 
the obsolescence of international conflict. This conclusion depends on 
the predictions that liberal democracy will become universal and that 
liberal democracies will continue to cooperate when they no longer 
have common enemies. Fukuyama bases these bets on his teleological 
reading of Hegel's dialectic of recognition. Fukuyama understands 
Hegel to depict history as a movement from asymmetric, unequal, ex-
clusive recognition to reciprocal, equal, universal recognition. Equat-
ing liberal democracy with recognition, Fukuyama reasons that it 
must become universal in scope. With universal liberal democracy, 
the drama of history will conclude and the thymotic motive for war 
will vanish. 
The difficulty is that Hegel was aware of Kant's proposal that a 
universal liberal alliance could banish war, and he emphatically re-
jected it: 
Perpetual peace is often advocated as an ideal towards which humanity 
should strive. With that end in view, Kant proposed a league of 
monarchs to adjust differences between states, and the Holy Alliance was 
meant to be a league of much the same kind. But the state is an individ-
ual, and individuality essentially implies negation. Hence even if a 
number of states make themselves into a family, this group as an individ-
ual must engender an opposite and create an enemy.59 
Far from predicting perpetual peace, Hegel thought it inherently 
impossible. 
Where does Fukuyama go wrong? 
Fukuyama's problems begin with a common misunderstanding of 
the Hegelian dialectic as a secular eschatology, the itinerary for a jour-
ney to a promised land. In light of the instrumental rationality that 
pervades experience in a technologically advanced society, we expect 
any philosophy of history to narrate the implementation of a plan. 
This view of history also resonates with the Augustinian dualism 
transmitted by Christianity. Against the background of Christian es-
chatology, if we learn that Hegel is an idealist, we understand him to 
explain temporal events by reference to ideas that are eternal and tran-
scendental, something like a design in the mind of God. 60 The secular-
59. HEGEL, supra note 47, at§ 324 add. 
60. Pp. 56, 58 (declaiming that the concept of History, as used by Hegel, implies progress, 
which in tum implies a purpose or end that provides a fixed standard of value). Hegel easily 
lends himself to such a reading. Seemingly endorsing the idea that history is the unfolding of a 
preordained plan, we find Hegel telling his students that "Reason, in its most concrete represen-
tation, is God. God governs the world. The actual working of His government, the carrying out 
of His plan is the history of the world." G.W.F. HEGEL, REASON IN HISTORY 47 (Roberts. 
Hartman trans., Liberal Arts Press 1953) (1837). In reading such a passage, however, we must 
be careful not to ascribe to Hegel an Augustinian notion of God or a Platonic notion of reason. 
Rather than likening history to these static and transcendental categories, Hegel means to import 
dynamism and immanence into our conceptions of God and Reason by likening them to history. 
He introduces the analogy of reason to God as frankly heuristic, strategic, and ironic, drawing 
1512 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:1491 
ized version of God's plan is natural law, while our instrumentalism 
suggests an image of human nature as a universal desire or need. 
Thus, both religious tradition and modern science accustom us to rep-
resenting history as the progressive satisfaction of a naturally occur-
ring desire. Fukuyama interprets Hegel accordingly, as a prophet of 
utopia, an anti-Marx who credits capitalism with the fulfillment of 
human nature and the transcendence of all discontent. 
Unlike Marx' material dialectic, however, Hegel's does not lead us 
to the promised land of utopia. 61 His is an integrative movement of 
mind toward the comprehension, rather than the extinction, of con-
flict. For Hegel conflict is not an impediment to the realization of 
human nature: it is the enabling condition for the creative striving 
that makes us human. Humanity's struggle for recognition reaches no 
conclusion; there is no pastoral retirement awaiting us at the end of 
history. 
Nor is Hegel's dialectic a prophecy.62 It is an interpretive theory, 
aimed at finding the meaning of an ever-lengthening past in light of an 
ever-changing present. Hegel's idealism is no Augustinian dualism in 
which ideas direct the players from offstage. 63 Not directors of the 
course of history, ideas are the course of history, intelligible after the 
the historical connection of the thought that Reason rules the world with another form of it, 
well known to us - that of religious truth: that the world is not abandoned to chance and 
external accident but controlled by Providence. . . . I do not make any demand on your 
belief in the principle announced; but I think I may appeal to this belief in its religious form 
On the other hand, a difference, indeed an opposition, now appears between this faith 
and our principle . . . . [T]his faith .•. is not followed up in definite application to the 
whole, the comprehensive course of world history. . . . This definiteness of Providence is 
usually called its plan. Yet this very plan is supposed to be hidden from our view; indeed, 
the wish to recognize it is deemed presumption. 
Id. at 14-15. On one level, Hegel is borrowing the authority of religion to win a suspension of 
disbelief for the claims of speculative philosophy. On a second level, he is using irony to shame 
his lazy, skeptical undergraduates into working at the philosophy of history, by pointing out their 
credulity when it comes to religious mysteries which, because taken on faith, entail no further 
thought. On a third level, however, he is subverting the conventional view that history's plan is 
known even to God in advance of its unfolding. Hegel defines God as "wisdom endowed with 
infinite power which realizes its own aim," id. at 15, and reason similarly as "the power capable 
of actualizing itself." Id. at 47. Yet because ideas only fully exist when they become actual -
hence Hegel's famous identification of the actual and the rational - reason is not a blueprint for 
history, but history itself. By extension God, or Spirit, is also the rational order immanent in 
history. What are "the means ... Spirit uses for actualizing its concept"? "[I]t is the activity of 
the subjects in whom Reason is present as their substantial essence in itself, but still obscure and 
concealed from them." Id. at 48. In short, Spirit is the order created by the aggregate meaning-
making of human beings intelligible after the fact. 
61. See CHARLES TAYLOR, HEGEL 419 (1975) (observing that Hegel rejected the utopian 
ideal of "total participation" that Rousseau and Marx embraced). 
62. Id. at 460. 
63. Since ideas do not transcend, they also cannot precede, their concrete expression. For 
modem elaborations of Hegel's point about the fusion of intuition and expression, see R.G. Col-
lingwood, Art as Expression, in A MODERN BOOK OF EsTHETICS: AN ANTHOLOGY 90 (Melvin 
Rader ed., 4th ed. 1973), and Benedetto Croce, Intuition and Expression, in A MODERN BOOK 
OF EsTHETICS: AN ANTHOLOGY 75 (Melvin Rader ed., 4th ed. 1973). 
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fact. 64 For Hegel history is created by the collective meaningmaking 
of human beings that constitutes Spirit, but not according to any pre-
existing design. 65 
Fukuyama's misidentification of Hegel with Marx' utopianism dis-
torts the crucial allegory of master and slave. Fukuyama misinterprets 
Hegel's demonstration of the failure of nonreciprocal recognition as a 
demonstration of the failure of exclusive recognition. In the two-per-
son world of Hegel's fable, nonreciprocity is identical to nonuniversal-
ity. But, in the real world, these are not the same and, as 
commentators have noted, 66 there is nothing inherently futile about 
reciprocal recognition within an exclusive elite. Hegel's conception of 
recognition in fact requires exclusion. We can never be directly appre-
hended in all our uniqueness: recognition is always mediated by a so-
cial identity that joins us with some and differentiates us from others. 67 
If one lesson of Hegel's allegory of master and slave is the empti-
ness of nonreciprocal recognition, another is the emptiness of recogni-
tion that is coerced rather than earned. Recognition is valued only 
when conferred for some socially valued accomplishment. Here again, 
Fukuyama jumps to utopian conclusions, reasoning that, since coerced 
recognition is dissatisfying, war serves no thymotic function. 
Although war cannot satisfy the desire for recognition, Hegel saw it as 
an inevitable outgrowth of the struggle for recognition in a world in 
which opportunities for socially valued accomplishment are tragically 
scarce. The resulting competition for these scarce opportunities drives 
modem states into war. 6s 
Socially valuable labor, Hegel reasoned, requires access to re-
sources. In this way, the institutions of property and contract can fa-
cilitate self-expression. 69 Yet, the aggregate effect of individuals' 
efforts to seek social recognition for their uses of property is a market 
for its exchange in which they paradoxically feel anonymous and help-
less. Following Adam Smith, Hegel observed that commerce tended 
to divide labor and concentrate capital, leading ultimately to techno-
logical innovation and automation. The resulting decrease in demand 
for labor, Hegel anticipated, would mean not only declining wages and 
working conditions, but also reduced opportunities for recognition. 70 
Technological innovation threatens recognition by displacing 
64. HEGEL, supra note 47, at 12-13. 
65. TAYLOR, supra note 61, at 419-20. 
66. See, e.g., ORLANDO PATIERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH 97-101 (1982). 
67. TAYLOR, supra note 61, at 447-48. 
68. See GUYORA BINDER, TREATY CONFLICT AND POLITICAL CONTRADICTION: THE DIA-
LECTIC OF DUPLICITY 81-84 (1988). 
69. HEGEL, supra note 47, at §§ 41-53 (property as medium of self-expression); §§ 72-81 
(contract). 
70. HEGEL, supra note 51, at 232-39. 
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workers in two senses. First, by rendering workers redundant, techno-
logical innovation eliminates opportunities for earning recognition. 
Second, by inviting the rapid reallocation of capital and labor, techno-
logical innovation destroys the communities of work and residence 
that confer recognition on individuals. 71 Deprived of social identities, 
individuals have no way to formulate their interests and pursue them 
collectively, so that the market undermines democracy. Finally, by 
undermining the democratic legitimacy of the state, the market can 
threaten the security of property and so self-destruct. 
Because Hegel saw that the market included thymotic costs that 
Fukuyama leaves out of his account of capitalism, he saw the need for 
corrective institutions that Fukuyama leaves out of his definition of 
liberal democracy. To counteract the thymotic as well as the eco-
nomic burdens of unemployment, Hegel proposed a program of public 
works. 72 To replace the traditional communities of recognition dis-
rupted by market forces, Hegel proposed a network of intermediate 
associations - guilds, professions, and the like - to educate, to foster 
and to sustain identity, to spread risk, and to formulate political will. 73 
In an effort to counteract the anonymity and ruthless competition of 
liberal society, Hegel anticipated the macroeconomic strategies of the 
modern welfare state and resuscitated some of the corporatism of the 
ancien regime. 
These corrective institutions are not costless, however. Hegel wor-
ried that public employment will cause overproduction, driving down 
the prices of privately produced goods and further undermining the 
economic and thymotic status of other workers. 74 Crises of underem-
ployment and overproduction lead to colonial adventures aimed at de-
veloping foreign markets for excess workers and goods. 75 Meanwhile, 
intermediate associations, in order to play their stabilizing social role, 
must also be protected against market dislocations. This requires pro-
tection against not only domestic but also foreign competition. Each 
of Hegel's strategies for sustaining recognition thus forces the state 
into conflict with other nations. 
The resulting conflict need not be universal because alliances can 
be mutually beneficial; but such alliances can never be universal. 
Hegel correctly grasped the structure of international relations that 
would prevail for the century following Waterloo - mutual recogni-
tion and peace among a small club of colonial powers underwritten by 
71. HEGEL, supra note 47, at §§ 197-98. 
72. Id. at § 245. 
73. AVINERI, supra note 46, at 161-75; HEGEL, supra note 47, §§ 252, 253, 303, 308, 290 
add.; TAYLOR, supra note 61, at 437, 443. 
74. HEGEL, supra note 47, at § 245. 
75. Id. §§ 246, 248 add. 
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the nonrecognition and exploitation of the rest of the world. 76 Karl 
Polanyi argued persuasively that, as more Europeans joined political 
life between 1848 and 1914, they erected barricades of "social insur-
ance" and "protection" that eventually brought the market to a halt, 
precipitating a world war and a quarter century of economic crisis. 77 
Perhaps with the end of the cold war, we are once again entering a 
period of great power amity, Kant's liberal alliance rather than Met-
ternich's Holy Alliance. But as long as the contradiction between 
market alienation and recognition remains unresolved, we dare not as-
sume that such amity will be universal. 78 
Fukuyama is able to prophesy universal amity only because he 
blinds himself to this contradiction between commerce and recogni-
tion. The only cost of markets he is willing to acknowledge is the 
material inequality they engender, not the feelings of anonymity and 
ineffectuality, nor their effects on political participation. The only is-
sue he regards as political is the extent of governmental redistribution 
of wealth. Hence, Fukuyama silently relegates all questions regarding 
the organization of work, association, the family, childcare, education, 
communications, and urban space to the "sub-political ... domain of 
culture and of society" (p. 213). Movements to reform any of these 
institutions, no matter how sweeping, therefore cannot count as radi-
cal challenges to liberalism (p. 293). 
Yet for Hegel, Fukuyama's ostensible mentor, this supposedly 
"sub-political" realm of culture and society is where identity is con-
ferred and recognized. It is in the realm of culture and society that 
individual and national interests are formulated, and governments le-
gitimized or discredited. No institutions play a more fundamental role 
in making us what we are than the institutions of civil society, no re-
form could be more radical than their reform, and no dispute could be 
more political than the debate over their future. 
IV. THE POLITICS OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
This is the premise of Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato's monumen-
tal study, Civil Society and Political Theory. Where Fukuyama's argu-
ment stresses the discontinuities between West and East, Cohen and 
Arato emphasize the continuities; and where Fukuyama sees the tri-
umph of reform in the East as a vindication of the status quo in the 
76. See BINDER, supra note 68, at 18-22; MORTON A. KAPLAN & NICHOLAS DEB. KATZEN-
BACH, THE PoLmCAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 314-40 (1961); HERSH LAU-
TERPACHT, RECOGNmON IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 158-74 (1947). 
77. See generally KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1957). 
78. Perhaps Fukuyama is right that postideological and postindustrial powers will be less 
covetous of third world hearts and mines. But if ex-superpowers will be less aggressive in the 
"less-developed" world they will also be less interested. In the near future much of humanity 
will experience not liberal utopia, but Malthusian apocalypse - famine, disease, civil war, anar-
chy - and the violence of the developed world will be no less violent for being passive. 
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West, Cohen and Arato see reform in the East and the West as parallel 
projects. Interest in civil society as a site of reform arose both in the 
West and the East over the past quarter century for essentially the 
same reason - the disappointment and defeat of efforts to achieve 
reform through the state. 
A. The Politics of Civil Society in the West 
During the austerity of the 1970s and the privatization process of 
the 1980s, a variety of factors encouraged European and American 
leftists to trim their sails. Economic indictments of the welfare state 
were widely disseminated and seemingly confirmed by the punishment 
international financial markets inflicted on governments pursuing re-
distributive programs. 79 A weakening of the trade union movement 
further undermined political support for the welfare state. While still 
hoping for capitalism's apocalyptic crisis in some far off "final analy-
sis," Marxist political economists increasingly conceded that state pol-
icy and national politics would remain hostage to international 
markets for several centuries. 80 The collapse of communism provided 
conclusive evidence that siding with the state against the market put 
the left on the wrong side of history. 
Finding virtue in necessity, theorists and activists began to ques-
tion the desirability as well as the practicability of using the state as an 
instrument of working-class interests. On both sides of the Atlantic, a 
broad range of academics converged on a critique of the welfare state 
as the bureaucratic management of those it purported to empower and 
serve. Activists in Germany complained that working-class-affiliated 
parties were so corruptly implicated in the military-industrial complex 
that they were incapable of pursuing the emerging peace and environ-
mental issues. The emerging movement of feminism challenged radi-
calism's traditional confinement of politics to the "public spheres" of 
state and market. 81 
Deeper suspicions began to surface that the left's traditional dream 
of a revolutionary utopia was dangerously sentimental and simplis-
tic. 82 Revolution struck poststructuralists as implying the return of 
power to an original popular sovereign unmediated by representative 
institutions. 83 They suspected that utopianism similarly expressed an 
79. See, e.g., Fred Block, Social Policy and Accumulation: A Critique of the New Consensus, 
in STAGNATION AND RENEWAL 13 (Martin Rein et al. eds., 1987). 
80. See Immanuel Wallerstein, Dependence in an Interdependent World: The Limited Pos-
sibilities of Transformation Within the Capitalist World Economy, 17 AFR. STUD. REV. 1 (1974). 
81. P. 12 (right wing critique of welfare state); pp. 42-47 (German "Greens" attack on party 
system, as articulated by Claus Offe); pp. 532-48 (feminist critique of state/market dichotomy); 
pp. 262-68 (Foucaultian attack on welfare state). 
82. See Binder, supra note 36, at 2008-12. 
83. Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The ''Mystical Foundation of Authority," 11 CARDOZO L. 
REv. 919 (Mary Quaintance trans., 1990). 
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unrealistic hope of returning humanity to some unalienated natural 
state. Poststructuralists came to view all such efforts to resist heteron-
omy as totalitarian threats to heterogeneity.84 Others endorsed leftist 
critiques of the market but felt tom between the competing utopias of 
meaningful work, cultural community, and participatory politics. Un-
willing to embrace the individualism or value neutrality often associ-
ated with an ethic of consumption, they nevertheless began to see civil 
society as a forum in which a plurality of goods could be pursued col-
lectively. A differentiated society, in which success is measured and 
recognition conferred along a multiplicity of parameters, seems un-
likely to be a hierarchical society. 85 
To Western reformers, then, civil society has come to represent a 
setting in which the New Left themes of community and participatory 
democracy can be pursued at a safe distance from both the embarrass-
ment of Marxism and the demands of capitalism. 
B. The Politics of Civil Society in the East 
For Eastern reformers also, the tum to civil society began as a 
prudential strategy. Recalling Soviet repression of both popular 
revolution in Hungary and government-led reform in Czechoslovakia, 
Eastern Europeans might well have despaired of achieving any mean-
ingful change. But Polish reformer Adam Michnik instead drew the 
conclusion that reform might be sustainable so long as it left the state-
party apparatus intact. The goal of reform, Michnik concluded, 
should be to create a vocal, organized, and politically informed public, 
capable of criticizing, influencing, and legitimizing state policy.86 
Surprisingly, this strategy met with a measure of encouragement 
from governing elites in Poland, Hungary, and the Soviet Union. Like 
the French Revolution, some of the Eastern European revolutions 
seemed ascribable to the efforts of absolutist rulers to discipline their 
recalcitrant subordinates by mobilizing public opinion. 87 In the Soviet 
and Hungarian cases, economic crises induced a new generation of 
leaders to try market-oriented reforms. As these reforms met with 
bureaucratic resistance, the new leaders sought popular support, 
thereby encouraging the emergence of a civic public. 88 In the Polish 
84. See, e.g., Iris M. Young, The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference, in FEMl-
NISM/POSTMODERNISM 300 (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990). 
85. See DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY (1989); Michael 
Walzer, A Better Vision: The Idea of Civil Society, 1991 DISSENT 293. 
86. Pp. 31-32; ADAM MICHNIK, A New Evolutionism, in LETIERS FROM PRISON AND 
OTHER EssAYS 135 (Maya Latynski, trans., 1985). 
87. For an interpretation of the French Revolution as the monarchy losing control of its own 
modernization policy, see SIMON SCHAMA, CITIZENS: A CHRONICLE OF THE FRENCH REVOLU-
TION (1989). 
88. Pp. 60-65. For an extensive discussion of the emergence of a civic public in the Soviet 
Union, see GEOFFREY HOSKING, THE A WAKENING OF THE SOVIET UNION (1990), especially at 
50-75, 126-56. For accounts of the Hungarian transition, see Barnabas Racz, Political Pluralisa-
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case, an unrepentant regime lost the ability to maintain economic or-
der. Here, too, the government came to see dissidents - already or-
ganized by Solidarity and by the Church - less as enemies than as 
potential partners with whom to negotiate some alternative to anar-
chy. 89 Once mobilized, legitimated, and in time even legally protected, 
the new civic publics could not be confined to commenting on eco-
nomic policy. Once the principle of popular consultation was thus en-
trenched, pressure for democratization became difficult to resist. 
Had the Eastern European revolutions followed the course of the 
French revolution, we might have expected a Jacobin moment in 
which the revolutionary vanguard threw off the shackles of the old 
regime and constituted themselves representatives of a sovereign. 
Some have suggested that they will do so, 90 and some have suggested 
that they should.91 But many Eastern European reformers have ex-
pressed a continuing commitment to the civil society strategy and a 
self-conscious resistance to the Jacobin temptation.92 Seeing totalitar-
ian dangers in the invocation of an extraconstitutional sovereign, they 
have preferred to amend existing organic laws, deficient in popular 
legitimacy though those laws may be.93 By eschewing the fiction that 
institutions are brought into being by the unitary will of a constituent 
power, reformers have expressed a commitment to the rule of law, 
avoided self-apotheosis, and they have welcomed a plurality of polit-
ical voices into the reform process. 
Perhaps dangerously, these voices have often included prior ruling 
elites. Yet just as these elites were not strong enough to rule without 
the legitimation of the dissidents, the former dissidents may not yet be 
strong enough - may not wish to be strong enough - to rule without 
the supporters of the old regime. By inviting the communists in, the 
reformers avoid provoking counterrevolution, share responsibility for 
unpopular austerity programs, and broaden the still narrow civic 
tion in Hungary: The 1990 Elections, 43 SOVIET STUD. 107 (1991); Anna Seleny, Hidden Enter-
prise and Property Rights Reform in Socialist Hungary, 13 LAW & POLY. 149 (1991); Rudolf L. 
Tokes, Hungary's New Political Elites: Adaptation and Change, 1989-90, PRODS. OF COMMU· 
NISM, Nov. - Dec. 1990, at 44; Ivan Volgyes, Leadership Drift in Hungary: Empirical Observa· 
tions on a Normative Concept, 22 STUD. CoMP. COMMUNISM 23 (1989). 
89. Pp. 65-66. For fuller accounts of the role of civil associations in the Polish transforma-
tion, see LAWRENCE GOODWYN, BREAKING THE BARRIER: THE RISE OF SOLIDARITY IN PO-
LAND 255-311 (1991); MICHAEL D. KENNEDY, PROFESSIONALS, POWER AND SOLIDARITY IN 
POLAND 161-95 (1991); Robert Zuzowski, The Origins of Open Organized Dissent in Today's 
Poland: KOR and Other Dissident Groups, 25 E. EUR. Q. 59 (1991). 
90. Wiktor Osiatyiiski, The Constitution-Making Process in Poland, 13 LAW & POLY. 125, 
132 (1991). . 
91. ACKERMAN, supra note 34, at 46-68. 
92. This preference for a differentiated and institutionalized sovereign over a unitary popular 
sovereign is a strong theme in Hegel's political theory. See TAYLOR, supra note 61, at 405-06, 
412-13, 434. 
93. Ulrich K. Preuss, The Politics of Constitution Making: Transforming Politics into Consti-
tutions, 13 LAW & POLY. 107, 109-13 (1991). 
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Motivating the reformers' self-limiting gestures is the goal of insu-
lating civil society from the state. What is not yet clear is the extent to 
which civil society will be identified with emergent markets. In Po-
land, the mobilization of civil society preceded privatization, and there 
is some evidence that the privatization process is being planned to pre-
serve or foster workplace association by giving or selling enterprises to 
their workers.95 In Hungary, on the other hand, considerable priva-
tization had already occurred under communism, and some believe 
this precipitated the emergence of a reform constituency. 96 While 
markets were part of the program upon which all the reform move-
ments rode to power,97 Eastern Europeans cynically expect privatiza-
tion to benefit primarily former party members with more connections 
and hard currency.98 Echoing Hegel, some observers are also con-
cerned about the threat unregulated markets may pose to the solidar-
ity of the very associations that enabled reform in the first place. 99 
Cohen and Arato warn that 
[democratic] actors will not be able to accept liberal economic policy as 
anything but transitional, since a fully automatic market would become 
destructive for the social fabric, for social solidarity. Karl Polanyi's les-
son should not be forgotten, particularly in his native country, and in-
deed the actors of civil society will certainly relearn it. [p. 489] 
Surprisingly, this dual anxiety of Eastern European reformers to 
insulate civil society from both state and market converges with the 
recent thought of reformers in the West. 
V. A CULTURAL THEORY OF POLITICS: CIVIL SOCIETY AND 
POLITICAL THEORY 
Drawing together the Eastern and Western variants of the civil 
society argument, Cohen and Arato urge the advantages of civil soci-
ety's differentiation from state and market. Principally, they urge that 
civil society is a more auspicious site for further democratizing con-
temporary society than either state or market (p. 417). 
No review can fairly summarize this epic, eclectic, almost encyclo-
pedic100 volume, which introduces the reader to the conceptions and 
94. Bruce Ackerman offers a similar argument against draconian punishment of prior ruling 
elites. ACKERMAN, supra note 34, at 69-98. 
95. Andrzej A. Czynczyk, Privatization in Poland: Politics, Society, and the Law, 13 LAW & 
POLY. 171, 172-76 (1991). 
96. Seleny, supra note 88. 
97. See Preuss, supra note 93, at 111. 
98. Czynczyk, supra note 95, at 176; Voytek Zubek, The Polish Communist Elite and the 
Petty Entrepreneurs, 25 E. EUR. Q. 339, 355 (1991). 
99. See TAYLOR, supra note 61, at 405. 
100. A more completely encyclopedic volume would have given us a fuller introduction to 
such predecessors of Hegel as Bodin, Locke, Montesquieu, Hutcheson, and Herder; would have 
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critiques of civil society developed by - to mention only the starring 
roles - Michnik, 101 Hegel, 102 Parsons, 103 Gramsci, 104 Arendt, 105 
Schmitt, 106 Habermas, 101 Foucault, 108 Luhmann, 109 Teubner, 110 
Offe,111 Touraine,112 Tilly,113 and Fraser. 114 For our purposes, how-
ever, Cohen and Arato's argument is most usefully understood as a 
challenge to four conventional oppositions in contemporary political 
debate. 
First, by stressing the potential autonomy of civil society, Cohen 
and Arato challenge the conventional division of society into state and 
market (pp. 11-18); the authors take particular pains to distinguish 
civil society from each. Thus they criticize classical democracy's iden-
tifi.cation of community and polity for politicizing all social life, in-
cluding questions of culture (pp. 197-200); and they express the 
concern that Hegel would not sufficiently insulate civil society from 
given more attention to Hegel's great contemporary De Tocqueville; and would not have ne· 
glected Hegel's most important successor, Otto Gierke. 
101. MICHNIK, supra note 86. 
102. HEGEL, supra note 47. 
103. TALCOIT PARSONS, THE SYSTEM OF MODERN SOCIETIES (1971). 
104. ANTONIO GRAMSCI, PRISON NOTEBOOKS (Joseph A. Buttigieg ed. & Joseph A. But-
tigieg & Antonio Callari trans., Columbia Univ. Press 1992) (1975). 
105. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION (1958); HANNAH ARENDT, ON 
REVOLUTION (1963); HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (1951). 
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the influence of the state (pp. 233, 248, 249, 411 ). On the other hand, 
they object to the Scottish school's identification of sociability with 
commerce (pp. 89-90) and reject Marx' reduction of civil association 
to bourgeois bargaining (p. 411). 
For Cohen and Arato, the state and the market are distinct subsys-
tems within society (p. 428), best understood as tools or steering mech-
anisms that aggregate and implement voter and consumer preferences 
(pp. 471-72). Perhaps alienating, these steering mechanisms are never-
theless useful and inevitable features of modem society (p. 415). Only 
in civil society does the modem citizen-consumer receive her ration of 
recognition (pp. 376, 417, 472, 480). While the state is the arena of 
politics and the market of economics, Cohen and Arato see civil soci-
ety as the seat of culture. They further divide culture into three as-
pects: (1) civil society's institutional structure, by which they mean 
the associations that make up civil society (pp. 428-29), (2) the group 
identities conferred and recognized within civil society (pp. 376-78, 
558-60), and (3) the codes of normative discourse - the shared pur-
poses, perspectives, traditions, and vocabularies - that hold groups 
together (pp. 435-36, 526). To say that the subsystem of civil society is 
the seat of culture is to say that it functions within the larger social 
system to produce the preferences aggregated by the subsystems of 
state and market. 
Second, following Michnik, Cohen and Arato blur the neat distinc-
tion between reform and revolution (p. 493). The differentiation of so-
ciety into several relatively autonomous subsystems implies that 
change can take place in one without dramatically altering another. 
Indeed, Cohen and Arato suggest that the successful reform of one 
subsystem may depend on the stable support of the others. At the 
very least, reform stands a better chance if it does not simultaneously 
threaten interests entrenched in all three. Because the goal of total 
revolution attacks society as an integrated totality, however, it is 
pragmatically unrealistic and normatively undesirable. 
Third, by stressing civil society's artificiality, Cohen and Arato 
challenge the conventional opposition between liberalism and commu-
nitarianism (pp. 8-10). Here, they have four related points to make. 
First, following Hegel, 115 they distinguish the associations of civil 
society from the traditional ascriptive communities threatened by 
modernization (pp. 500-03, 524). Many of the institutions of civil so-
ciety - professional societies, charitable organizations, trade unions 
- are distinctively modem and wholly voluntary. In addition, many 
of the characteristic activities of these organizations - meeting, 
marching, striking, publishing, lobbying, suing - are made possible 
by characteristically modem legal protections. 
115. P. 106; TAYLOR, supra note 61, at 435. 
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Thus, a second point is that the collective action of civil associa-
tions depends upon the civil liberties of individuals (pp. 400-03, 562). 
Third, if modern community depends upon liberal rights, liberal 
individualism also depends upon community. Following Hegel, Co-
hen and Arato reason that individual identity is conferred by social 
recognition in the context of community (pp. 377-78). What makes 
modern society freer than a traditional ascriptive community is not the 
absence of community, but the availability of multiple communities 
offering a given individual multiple identities (pp. 433-36). 
Fourth, solidarity depends upon and fosters not only the liberta-
rian, but also the democratic aspect of liberalism. Solidarity depends 
upon democracy because civil society is an artificial construct, not a 
given. The formation and sustenance of civil associations depend 
upon a myriad of social and political choices.116 Hence, we cannot 
secure solidarity without democratic control over the conditions of 
civil association. At the same time democracy depends upon solidar-
ity because, as Michael Walzer puts it, 
[n]o state can survive for long if it is wholly alienated from civil society. 
It cannot outlast its own coercive machinery; it is lost, literally, without 
its firepower. The production and reproduction ofloyalty, civility, polit-
ical competence, and trust in authority are never the work of the state 
alone, and the effort to go it alone - one meaning of totalitarianism - is 
doomed to failure. 111 
A fourth currently conventional opposition Cohen and Arato chal-
lenge is the distinction between representative and participatory democ-
racy (pp. 4-8). Partisans often defend representative democracy as a 
device for consulting and accommodating all interest groups powerful 
enough to disrupt the social order. Participatory democracy, by con-
trast, is usually defended as a path to self-realization, deliberative ra-
tionality, and group solidarity. But because group interests are 
formulated in civil society, reason Cohen and Arato, participatory and 
representative democracy can coexist. Civil society is the context for 
participation with its attendant educational benefits (pp. 417, 599). 
The political subsystem is the context for representation, the steering 
116. As Michael Walzer points out: 
Families with working parents need state help in the form of publicly funded day care and 
effective public schools. National minorities need help in organizing and sustaining their 
own educational programs. Worker-owned companies and consumer cooperatives need 
state Joans or Joan guarantees; so do (even more often) capitalist entrepreneurs and firms. 
Philanthropy and mutual aid, churches and private universities, depend upon tax exemp-
tions. Labor unions need legal recognition and guarantees against "unfair labor practices." 
Professional associations need state support for their licensing procedures. And across the 
entire range of association, individual men and women need to be protected against the 
power of officials, employers, experts, party bosses, factory foremen, directors, priests, par-
ents, patrons; and small and weak groups need to be protected against large and powerful 
ones. For civil society, left to itself, generates radically unequal power relationships, which 
only state power can challenge. 
WALZER, supra note 85, at 302. 
117. Id. at 301. 
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of policy by interests. Absent broad participation in the formulation 
of group interests, their pursuit in the crass arena of interest-group 
politics cannot be democratically legitimate (p. 418). At the same 
time, if democratically formulated interests are not zealously repre-
sented, fairly aggregated, and efficiently implemented, democracy will 
also be thwarted (pp. 414-15). Hence, representative and par-
ticipatory democracy are not just compatible, but mutually dependent 
norms governing the distinct arenas of state and civil society. 
Although this collaboration between representation and participa-
tion depends partly on the separation between state and civil society, it 
also links these arenas together. For Cohen and Arato do not simply 
accept the conventional dichotomy between deliberative participation 
and adversarial representation. Instead, they regard deliberative ra-
tionality as a criterion of legitimacy for all democratic processes, rep-
resentative as well as participatory. Representative democracy must 
not only aggregate but also integrate diverse interests by commen-
surating them to broadly shared principles and purposes (pp. 413, 
589). Cohen and Arato suggest that this purpose is best accomplished 
when the political process is permeated by deliberative bodies in which 
the associations of civil society are represented (pp. 482, 544, 547). 
While they are frustratingly vague on how to institutionalize these cul-
tural receptors, we might imagine a proliferation of citizen commis-
sions conducting public hearings and reporting on policy issues. Such 
a device would enable citizen participation while informing represen-
tative deliberation. 
In this complex vision of democracy, representative democracy de-
pends upon a participatory civil society not only for the preferences it 
aggregates, but for the civic culture - the mutually intelligible gram-
mar of argument, empathy, deference, and reconciliation - that en-
ables deliberation (pp. 413, 589). Yet, the achievement of this 
important contribution to democratic representation constrains civil 
society. Associations and groups must define themselves as part of a 
tolerant, pluralist society and must articulate their values in terms in-
telligible to others if they are to sustain, rather than simply take ad-
vantage of, democracy (p. 602). 
In sum, seeing liberal representative democracy as necessary but 
insufficient, Cohen and Arato would subject it to the influence of a 
relatively autonomous, solidaristic, and participatory civil society. 
How can this be accomplished? Cohen and Arato identify two 
types of reform strategies compatible with their program: social 
movements that attempt to change power relations by changing cul-
ture, and policy reforms that redistribute resources by empowering as-
sociations rather than simply transferring wealth. 
Sociologists have traditionally explained collective protest either as 
a mass hysterical reaction to social change (p. 495) or as the exploita-
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tion by long-standing interest groups of emergent conflicts among 
elites (pp. 496-503). Yet these theories have had difficulty accounting 
for the new social movements of the last three decades - the Ameri-
can civil rights movement; pacifist, feminist, and environmentalist 
movements throughout the West; liberation theology in Latin 
America; and prodemocracy movements in Latin America, and South-
ern and Eastern Europe. The arresting aspect of these movements is 
that they brought together and mobilized large numbers of previously 
unconnected people through rational discourse. Cohen and Arato see 
these movements as examples of discursive action's potential to change 
policy by changing the interests and self-conceptions of political actors 
(pp. 503-20, 530). 
The authors use the American feminist movement as an example 
of such a cultural path to political change (p. 548). In deliberately 
politicizing such "private sphere" issues as contraception, abortion, 
rape, sexual harassment, domestic violence, childcare, and women's 
health (pp. 551, 554-55), the practice of consciousness raising affects 
all the aspects of culture analyzed above. First and most obviously, by 
developing and disseminating new codes of normative discourse, con-
sciousness raising influences political views. Second, by naming unar-
ticulated grievances, such movements confer new identities. Third, 
political meetings, consciousness-raising groups, and the like provide 
solidarity by embodying those identities in new associative structures. 
Fourth, to the extent raised consciousness alters patterns of associa-
tion in the "private sphere," it further impacts culture (pp. 526, 550-
54). 
These cultural changes alter policymaking not only by changing 
the language of public debate, but also by including new participants, 
who become receptors of civil society in the political process. At this 
point winning legal protections against violence and discrimination or 
for reproductive autonomy becomes possible. Such protections, in 
tum, further entrench the movement in civil society by fostering new 
institutions such as abortion clinics, battered women's shelters, rape 
crisis centers, and daycare centers, and by continuing to restructure 
the most influential association in civil society, the family. 
Social movements win representation in policymaking by mobiliz-
ing participation in the realm of civil society, yet policymakers can 
affect the conditions of civil societal mobilization for better or worse. 
Cohen and Arato identify the controversial area of social welfare pol-
icy as one in which differing approaches can make civil society more 
or less participatory. Unwilling simply to endorse the repudiation of 
the welfare state that has recently emerged across the political spec-
trum, Cohen and Arato distinguish between welfare state reforms that 
empower and those that weaken civil society: 
Surely legal reforms that secure the freedom of wage workers to organize 
unions and bargain collectively, that protect them from being fired for 
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such collective action, and that secure worker representation on com-
pany boards differ in kind from means-tested grants to single parent 
households and from social services that "instruct" clients on how to 
function properly as childrearers and responsible providers according to 
some preconceived model. The difference between these types of reforms 
is not fully captured by reference to the genders (or, for that matter, to 
the race) of the people they target .... The former set of reforms, unlike 
the latter, do not create isolated clients of a state bureaucracy but rather 
empower individuals to act together collectively, to develop new solidari-
ties, and to achieve a greater balance of power relations because they are 
addressed to an area that is already formally organized. Such reforms 
create "receptors" in the economic subsystem for the influence of the 
norms and modes of action of civil society by putting procedures for 
discursive conflict resolution into place, thereby asserting control of the 
latter over the former without dedifferentiating them. The second type 
of reform does the reverse: It brings the full force of administrative 
agencies into areas that are not and should not be formally organized. 
This threatens the communicative infrastructure and autonomy of civil 
society and undermines the capacities of "beneficiaries" to act for them-
selves or to settle conflicts discursively. [p. 547; footnotes omitted] 
In preferring guarantees of job security, solidarity, and participation to 
mere transfer payments, Cohen and Arato replicate Hegel's point that 
social stability and political legitimacy depend upon a broad distribu-
tion not of wealth, but of recognition. 
Yet this Hegelian analysis of the social welfare problem reveals the 
greatest difficulty facing Cohen and Arato's cultural theory of politics. 
For Hegel, you may recall, the social welfare problem was modern 
society's Achilles' heel: no matter how much wealth markets gener-
ate, they can not by themselves generate universal recognition unless 
they can put everyone to productive, challenging, educative work. But 
the market's logic of competitive automation sets productivity and la-
bor intensity at odds. Although an advanced, postindustrial economy 
can easily afford welfare transfers to the marginally least productive 
laborers, this does not give them the recognition they desire. Produc-
tively employing them, however, leads to overproduction - which not 
only defeats the purpose, but also disrupts the market's efficient alloca-
tion of resources. Hence, Hegel's deeply pessimistic claim is that rec-
ognition and efficient allocation are ultimately incompatible - that 
culture and commerce are intractably opposed subsystems. 
What is the relationship between culture and commerce in Cohen 
and Arato's theory? While providing an elaborate and plausible vision 
of a participatory culture's democratizing influence on the political 
subsystem, they are frustratingly evasive on the desirability of simi-
larly democratizing the economic subsystem. Cohen and Arato worry 
that if workplace participation means perpetual meetings, it will im-
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pair efficiency.118 On the other hand, they endorse the representation 
of workers in corporate decisionmaking (pp. 416-17, 479) without ever 
explaining how workers are to develop the deliberative, participatory 
culture that would qualify such representation as democratic. If 
worker representation is nothing more than bargaining over economic 
interests ascribed to workers, it is simply another form of commerce, 
unaffected by culture. At one point Cohen and Arato suggest the con-
flicting claims of culture and commerce may be left to democratic res-
olution in the political subsystem (p. 399). But if the representative 
democracy of the political subsystem depends upon a deliberative, par-
ticipatory culture, and if the commercialization of association threat-
ens that culture, the political subsystem may lose its democratic 
character. 
At the core of Cohen and Arato's confusion concerning the rela-
tionship between culture and commerce is their equivocation on the 
importance of self-realization through meaningful work. For Hegel, 
work was a crucial arena for personal development and social recogni-
tion. He envisioned the organization of workers into societies admit-
ting members on the basis of proficiency and inculcating skills, ethics, 
and pride. 
The closest analogues to Hegel's guildlike corporations in our pos-
tindustrial service economy are the professions, and there is considera-
ble appeal to the idea of professionalizing all service. Bill Simon has 
suggested that professionalization not only enhances the dignity and 
interest of service work, but also the recognition and participation af-
forded service consumers or clients. 119 It also gives both parties a 
common interest and language, which may be the basis for political 
mobilization. 
But can these cultural benefits be achieved without reducing allo-
cative efficiency? Can a postindustrial service economy universalize 
recognition without provoking the crises of overproduction that Hegel 
foresaw for industrial economies? I suspect not. Health care provides 
the most spectacular example of the spiraling cost of professional serv-
ices. How much of this cost is ascribable to the Kantian ethic of valu-
ing each patient as an end in herself? The upside of this ethic is its 
recognition of the patient's uniqueness, and the challenge it affords 
doctors to test the utmost limits of their skill and compassion. The 
downside includes the expenditure of resources on high technology 
and deathbed heroics that would be better spent on preventive public 
health measures. 
Following Hegel, we may think of extraordinary care as a form of 
ll8. Pp. 20, 416, 453-54, 476 (describing conflicts between economic rationality and 
solidarity). 
119. William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE 
L.J. ll98 (1983). 
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overproduction in the service economy. Psychotherapy, litigation, and 
education may be services that are similarly overproduced in our soci-
ety, in self-defeating efforts to close a collective deficit of recognition. 
The fewer people we can employ making things, the more people we 
must employ producing human capital; but the more human capital 
we produce, the more human capital we must productively employ. 
Hegel's vicious cycle of overproduction and underrecognition seems to 
survive the passing of industrial society. Even if, as Fukuyama argues, 
the passing of industrial society has ended state-socialism's challenge 
to the market, the fundamental, generative conflict of culture and 
commerce endures. 
Unlike Fukuyama, Cohen and Arato recognize the composition of 
culture as a difficult political issue. But, like Fukuyama, they simply 
assume the peaceful coexistence of culture and commerce and thereby 
disguise the issue's real difficulty. 
VI. THE CURTAIN REMAINS OPEN, THE STAGE LIT 
The cold war fortified the boundary between state and market, en-
shrouding in iron the cultures constructing each. The parting of that 
iron curtain reveals the rich array of political choices facing us in the 
fashioning of culture. In politicizing culture, the end of the cold war 
broadens political debate from the single dimension of how much the 
state should regulate commerce to the polydimensional questions of 
what kind of state and what kind of market we aspire to have. 
Fukuyama remains blind to the political complexity revealed by 
the iron curtain's withdrawal. Recognizing only the cold war's single 
dimension of struggle, Fukuyama sees its end as the iron curtain's re-
treat rather than its breach. Hence, he remains blind to the contin-
gency revealed behind the curtain. What marks Fukuyama as a 
neoconservative is first, that his liberalism is rooted in an invariant 
conception of human nature, and second, that it is confined to the 
political and economic spheres. In the sphere of culture, he is con-
servative. For Fukuyama, culture is an unalterable given, a residue of 
traditional authority surviving the modernization of political and eco-
nomic life. It is crucially important, determining rates of productivity 
and violent crime; but it is beyond political debate, impervious to de-
liberate and deliberative choice, and outside history. Notwithstanding 
his appropriation of Hegel, Fukuyama is profoundly antihistoricist. If 
he now believes history is over, that is because he assumes nothing 
important could ever be decided by history anyway. 
If neoconservatives are cultural conservatives only, Cohen and 
Arato are neoradicals, confining their radicalism to the cultural 
sphere. Calling for radical cultural transformation, they see culture as 
a domain of political struggle and historical contingency. In this 
sense, they are genuine historicists. The difficulty is that, because cul-
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ture constructs political and economic interests, the politics of culture 
cannot be so neatly confined to the cultural sphere. Cohen and Arato 
confront and illuminate the complex linkages between the cultural do-
main of civil society and the political domain of the state. Here they 
seem gratified to point out that the cultural construction of politics 
permits its further democratization. But they leave the linkages be-
tween civil society and market in the shadows and evade the question 
of how much economic change a more democratic culture would 
require. 
We may understand post-totalitarian politics in two ways. We 
may conclude that the curtain has come down on history and the im-
portant political disputes have all been resolved in favor of liberalism. 
Or, recalling that liberalism garnered much of its meaning and appeal 
from its confrontation with totalitarianism, we may suspect that liber-
alism's triumph has drained it of content and consequence. Reminded 
of history's contingency by the cold war's denouement, we may specu-
late that post-totalitarian politics will prove equally unpredictable. 
Though our conflicts may now be confined to the realm of culture, 
culture is no refuge from history. It is where history gets made. 
The curtain remains open, the footlights beckon, and nothing pre-
vents our stepping onto the stage. 
